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Abstract 
 
In recent years, cyber security has become one of the most actively discussed topics of 
international law, not only because domestic and inter-State cyber security incidents have 
grown in number and severity, but also because of the realisation that the technical 
peculiarities of cyberspace create new and unique legal problems that previously have not 
been encountered.1 
In the Wales Summit Declaration on 5 September 2014, NATO recognized that 
international law, including international humanitarian law and the United Nations Charter 
(UN Charter), applies in cyberspace. A decision as to when a cyberattack would lead to the 
invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on a case-by-case 
basis.2 
Collective self-defense expressed in Article 5 of NATO Treaty is a well-known 
fundamental principle of NATO: “…an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all (…)”.3 
Although Article 5 of the NATO Treaty has no concept of the objects of armed attacks, 
cyberattacks as “Armed Attacks” can be carried out on Critical Infrastrucutre (CI), and on 
Critical Information Infrastructure (CII). Such objects can function for both military and 
civilian purposes. CI for civil purposes can be both in state and private ownership. The types 
of activities of such objects are important for the exercise of state functions. 
Purpose - The present article aims at analyzing concept, types, functions of critical 
infrastructure and cases of cyberattacks on such objects and to determine the relationship 
with definition of Armed Attack in light Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. 
Design/methodology/approach – the author of the article is comparing legal definitions of 
CI in-laws of member states of NATO that connects to cyberattacks and come across with 
differences and common points. The case of Estonia (cyberattack on government networks), 
Ukraine (cyberattack on CEI) and Stuxnet (cyberattacks against CI) are shortly reviewed. 
Finding - when it comes to cyberattacks, in most cases, it is conducted on a CII, which is 
directly connected and is the source of automatic control of critical infrastructure. To date, the 
most successful such definition is in the strategy for cybersecurity of Lithuania as a NATO 
member, and a partner of NATO, Finland. Case in Ukraine showed that CI works in 
disconnected access to the Internet network. However, working personnel periodically violated 
                                                 
1 Katharina Ziolkowski, Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace, International Law, 
International Relations and Diplomacy (Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2013), 621 
2 Wales Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, North Atlantic Council, para 72,  5 September 2014, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?selectedLocale=en 
3 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm  
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the rules of automated control and connected the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA)1 to the Internet. 
Research limitations/implications – the author uses NATO Treaty, legislation of the 
member countries of NATO to compare it and three cases of cyberattacks on CI. 
Practical implications – the article could be considered by NATO’ headquarters (NATO 
HQ), North Atlantic Council (NAC), Allied Command Transformation (ACT), NATO 
Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency), NATO accredited Centres of 
Excellence, in particularly NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO 
CCD COE), military legal advisers to the command of NATO allies and partner countries. 
Originality/Value – the problem of application of Article 5 of NATO Treaty to 
cyberattacks is quite new for NATO and partner countries as well. That also causes a novelty 
of that article – finding that cyberattacks on CI could be invoked right on the collective self-
defense for NATO. 
Keywords – Cyberattack, Armed Attack, NATO, Critical Infrastructure, Critical 
Information Infrastructure, Collective Self-Defense 
Research type – research paper 
 
 
Introduction 
 
To date, cyberattacks pose a serious threat to NATO's defense and security. 
Every time, cyberattacks become more sophisticated to identify and attribute to the 
attacker. There is no doubt that cyberattacks can create serious devastating 
consequences for CI of states. This can lead to disastrous consequences. 
It is possible that cyberattacks can be committed on CI designed for military 
purposes. The protection of such types of CI from cyberattacks is very important for 
the performance of the functions of state defense. In addition, cyberattacks can be 
used in combination with kinetic attacks, which can cause unpredictable 
consequences. 
Several states have in fact been the object of cyberattacks of which other states 
were suspected. In 2007, a three-week Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack 
targeted Estonia.2 Cyber operations also hit, among others, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Lithuania, Montenegro, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. In September 2010, a computer worm, dubbed Stuxnet, had 
attacked Iran’s industrial infrastructure.3 In December 2015, Ukraine faced a major 
escalation in the seriousness of cyberattacks on Critical Energy Infrastructure (CEI).1 
                                                 
1 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that are used to monitor and control 
features in the industrial sector and energy transit infrastructure. The security of the SCADA system 
consists of four major elements: real-time monitoring, detection of anomalies, impact analysis and 
mitigation strategies. 
Limba T.; Plėta T.; Agafonov K.; Damkus M. 2017. Cyber security management model for critical 
infrastructure, Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues 4(4), 561. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jesi.2017.4.4(12) 
2 “Cited from: For the facts of the case, see Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, and Liis Vihul, International 
Cyber Incidents. Legal Considerations (CCDCOE, 2010), pp 18 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books/legalconsiderations.pdf Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and 
the Use of Force in International law (UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 4. 
3 “Cited from: For a comprehensive technical analysis of Stuxnet, see Symantec’s Nicolas Falliere, Liam 
O Murchu, and Eric Chien, W32.Stuxnet Dossier, version 1.4, February 2011, 
<http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet
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Taking into account that the сyber threats and attacks are becoming more 
common, sophisticated and damaging, it is very important that such actions are 
countered with a strong commitment to existing international law and the values that 
it represents. The right to collective self-defense in the case of cyberattacks on CI 
becomes relevant and necessary for research in international law. 
One way of exercising collective self-defence is through a military alliance 
established to that purpose. The most significant collective self-defence international 
organization today is North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as source of 
stability in world and the transatlantic framework for strong collective defense.2 
Bearing in mind that NATO has affirmed the applicability of international law 
and article 5 of the NATO treaty in the case of cyberattacks, there is a scientific need 
to examine CI within the concept of cyberattack as "Armed Attack" according to 
Article 5 of NATO Treaty. 
The article will focus on analyzing: 1) the concept, types and functions of CI as 
objects of cyberattacks, 2) cyberattacks against CI: Estonia, Stuxnet and Ukraine 
cases study 3) the consequences of cyberattacks against CI in the light of the right to 
collective self-defense. 
 
Concepts, types and functions of CI as the objects of the cyberattack 
 
The cyberattacks can be directed at both CI and CII. In modern international 
law, there is no definition of these two concepts. However, NATO countries and 
partner countries refer to the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of the United 
States of 2001.3 This is defined CI as system and assets, whether physical or virtual, 
so vital to the country that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets 
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national 
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.4 
Although governments administer only a minority of the Nation`s CI computer 
systems, governments at all levels perform essential services that rely on each of the 
critical infrastructure sectors. Such sectors related to agriculture, food, water, public 
health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base, information and 
telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemicals and 
hazardous materials, and postal and shipping.5 
In turn, when it comes to cyberattacks, in most cases it is conducted on a CII, 
which is directly connected and is the source of automatic control of critical 
                                                                                                                                                                  
_dossier.pdf. Iran claims that its uranium enrichment programme is for purely civilian purposes. Marco 
Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International law (UK: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 6. 
1 “The first case of a successful cyberattack on energy objects has been registered in Ukraine” Ukrainian 
National News, http://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1552689-minenergovugillya-pershiy-u-sviti-vipadok-
vdaloyi-kiberataki-na-obyekti-energetiki-zareyestrovano-v-ukrayini  
2 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm 
3 Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001, the United States, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/s1407/text  
4 NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn , Estonia, https://ccdcoe.org/cyber-
definitions.html 
5 NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn , Estonia, https://ccdcoe.org/cyber-
definitions.html 
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infrastructure. To date, the most successful such definition is in the strategy for 
cybersecurity of Lithuania as a NATO member,1 and a partner of NATO, Finland2. 
According to approval of the program for the development of electronic 
information security (cyber-security) of Lithuania for 2011-2019, CII shall mean an 
electronic communications network, information system or a group of information 
systems (included all hardware and software that process, store, and communicate 
information, or any combination of all of these elements, computer systems; control 
systems (e.g. SCADA). In addition, it is included networks, such as the Internet; and 
cyber services (e.g., managed security services). are part of cyber infrastructure where 
an incident that occurs causes or may cause grave damage to national security, 
national economy or social well-being. 3 
In Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy from 2010, CII refers to the structures and 
functions behind the information systems of the vital functions of society which 
electronically transmit, transfer, receive, store or otherwise process information 
(data).4 
In a traditional armed attack, the fact that the target is military or civilian would 
not make any difference: the state where the target is located would be entitled to self-
defense because its territorial integrity has been violated.5 
Hence, Dinstein correctly points out that, if a conventional armed attack against 
a civilian facility on the territory of the target state would amount to an armed attack 
even if no member of the armed forces is injured or military property damaged, there 
is no reason to come to a different conclusion with regard to cyberattacks against 
civilian systems.6 
Most CI are not owned by the government, but by the private sector: the 
governmental or private character of the infrastructure targeted, however, is also not 
relevant to the determination of the existence of an armed attack against the state. It 
is not relevant that the computer system is run by a company possessing the 
nationality of a third state or that the computer system operated by the victim state is 
located outside its borders (for instance, in a military base abroad).7 
For a clear understanding of the enemy's real target as CI, the author suggests 
several examples of cyberattacks on CEI, like some situations during crisis (military) 
stage, which were used during Tabletop Exercise Coherent Resilience (CORE) 2017 in 
Ukraine: 1) As a result of cyberattacks, three regions have had their power 
interrupted. A 750 kV high-voltage substation is disconnected from the United Energy 
                                                 
1 “National cyber security strategy of Lithuania, Programme for the Development of Electronic 
Information Security for 2011–2019 (2011)”, https://ccdcoe.org/cyber-security-strategy-documents.html  
2 “National cyber security strategy Finland's Cyber Security Strategy (2013)“, https://ccdcoe.org/cyber-
security-strategy-documents.html  
3 NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn , Estonia, https://ccdcoe.org/cyber-
definitions.html 
4 NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn , Estonia, https://ccdcoe.org/cyber-
definitions.html 
5 Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International law (UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 76. 
6 “Cited from: Dinstein, ‘Computer Network Attacks’, p 106.“, Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and the 
Use of Force in International law (UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 76.  
7 Cited from: Dinstein, ‘Computer Network Attacks’, p 106-7.“, Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and the 
Use of Force in International law (UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 76. 
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System (UES) of Kray; 2) As a result of a cyber-attack on the SCADA system of 
telemechanical control, the system lost the opportunity to receive information.1 
These examples show that CI is the target of the attacker. Situations were used 
in real practice. A feature of these examples is that such an infrastructure works in 
disconnected access to the Internet network. However, working personnel periodically 
violated the rules of automated control and connected the system SCADA to the 
Internet. 
Taking into account the experience of previous cyberattacks on state critical CI 
facilities, as well as the results of Tabletop Exercise Coherent Resilience (CORE) 2017 
in Ukraine, the author suggests the following structure of the objects of cyberattacks 
in the light of Article 5 of the NATO treaty (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Objects of cyberattacks as “Armed Attack” in light Article 5 of NATO Treaty 
 
From this figure it can be concluded that cyberattacks as Armed Attacks can be 
carried out on CI, and on CII. Such objects can function for both military and civilian 
purposes. CI for civil purposes can be both in state and private ownership. The types 
of activities of such objects are important for the exercise of state functions. 
 
  
                                                 
1 Final Evaluation Report, Advanced Training Course on Critical Energy Infrastructure Security with 
Tabletop Exercise Coherent Resilience (CORE) 2017, NPS EAG, Kyiv, Ukraine. 
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Cyberattacks against CI: Estonia, Stuxnet and Ukraine cases study 
 
History knows several examples when cyberattacks were conducted on CI. 
Among them, the author would like to note Estonia (2007), Stuxnet (2010) and 
Ukraine (2015, 2016) cases. These cases are of an international nature, because, as a 
rule, cyberattacks were conducted outside the state. 
On April 26 and 27 of 2007, Estonia witnessed two nights of unprecedented street 
riots in the centre of Tallinn, its capital, by youth groups mostly of ethnic Russian 
origin. The riots had broken out in response to the government decision to remove a 
Soviet-era Second World War (WWII) memorial, a decision which had been 
accompanied by intense vocal opposition by Estonia and Russia.1 
Cyberattacks started in parallel to rioting on streets in the late hours of Friday, 
April 27, when web pages of Estonian government institutions and news portals came 
under a wave of cyberattacks.2 Attacks continued from April 27 to May 18 (3 weeks). 
The prime targets (and also those that experienced major effect) were 
information distribution channels of both the government and the private sector, and 
business sector websites, specifically, the banks. The work of vital databases, systems 
or registers of the public and private sector was not disrupted, but there were attacks 
directed at the national Internet infrastructure. Also, the common emergency number 
112 was targeted so that calls were briefly blocked.3 
The targets for cyberattack were mainly fourfold: servers of institutions that are 
responsible for the Estonian Internet infrastructure; governmental and political 
targets; services provided by the private sector; personal and random targets. Notably, 
traditional CI objects, such as information systems supporting transportation and 
energy systems, were not targeted.4 
The cyber effects had both a direct economic and a wider societal effect. As many 
sectors of commerce and industry rely on ICT infrastructure and electronic 
communication channels in their daily conduct of business, the overload of e-mail 
servers, network devices and web servers of internet service providers not only 
affected large entities such as banks, media corporations, and governmental 
institutions, but also small and medium-sized enterprises whose daily business 
activities were seriously impaired.5 The attacks also affected the nation’s information 
flow to the outside world. 
The question of invoking article 5 of NATO Treaty was never seriously 
considered. As expressed by Mr. Jaak Aaviksoo, Estonian defence ex-minister, it was 
clear that “At present, NATO does not define cyberattacks as a clear military action. 
                                                 
1 Among others, the foreign minister of the Russian Socor, Vladimir. ‘Moscow stung by Estonian ban on 
totalitarianism’s symbols’. Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, 26 Jan 2007. 
Available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32427  
2 Tikk, Kaska, Vihul, International Cyber Incidents. Legal Considerations (NATO CCDCOE, 2010), p 18 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books/legalconsiderations.pdf  
3 “Cited from: Estland im Visier: Ist ein Internetangriff der Ernstfall?. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
18.06.2007, Nr. 138 /Seite 6. (in German)”, 3 Tikk, Kaska, Vihul, International Cyber Incidents. Legal 
Considerations (NATO CCDCOE, 2010), pp 18 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books/legalconsiderations.pdf 
4 Tikk, Kaska, Vihul, International Cyber Incidents. Legal Considerations (NATO CCDCOE, 2010), p 21 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books/legalconsiderations.pdf 
5 Tikk, Kaska, Vihul, International Cyber Incidents. Legal Considerations (NATO CCDCOE, 2010), p 24 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books/legalconsiderations.pdf 
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Not a single NATO defence minister would define a cyberattack as a clear military 
action at present”.1 
Stuxnet, a malicious form of software also known as W32.Stuxnet worm, was 
first reported on 17 June 2010 under the name Rootkit.TmpHider. Stuxnet targeted 
the computer systems of five facilities (according to recorded WAN IP addresses / 
computer domain names) located in Iran, between June 2009 and May 2010. The 
worm affected specific industrial control systems which use a type of software for 
management of large-scale industrial systems SCADA systems developed by the 
company Siemens and showing specific configuration requirements.2 
According to Stuxnet´s architecture, the worm was created to amend the code of 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) of industrial control systems in order to 
amend the plant’s operations by manipulating frequency converter control systems 
and thus slowing down or speeding up a motor, as well as hiding such changes from 
the operator of the respective equipment. Nuclear infrastructures in Iran as the 
targets of Stuxnet, namely the uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and/or the 
nuclear power plant at Bushehr, suspecting that the speed of the IR-1 centrifuges´ 
rotors was being amended in order to negatively affect Iran´s nuclear programme.3 
Based on information available in media, it is not known whether Stuxnet did 
affect the physical integrity of IR-1 centrifuges or other components in Iran´s uranium 
enrichment plant at Natanz, the nuclear power plant at Bushehr or in other nuclear 
facilities. Iranian officials did not confirm any actual damage of a physical nature 
which had been caused by Stuxnet.4 
In December 2015, Ukraine faced a major escalation in the seriousness of the 
Russian cyberattacks on its CEI.5 According to the US Department of Homeland 
Security, which reported on the case, the Russian cyberattack on the Ukrainian CEI 
was one of the most successful cyberattacks on CEI in the world.6 
Facts are the following. An unpredictable blackout of electric power occurred in 
several areas of Ukraine (Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Kyiv regions) on 23 December 
2015, at about 4:30 in the morning. In that moment, a message appeared on the 
official website “Prykarpattiaoblenergo” (Ivano-Frankivsk region) about large-scale 
failures in the power supply system that occurred for unknown reasons. Immediately 
after the attack, it was discovered that the reason for stopping the work of the control 
equipment was an external intrusion into the operation of the power grid monitoring 
and control systems.7 
                                                 
1 Tikk, Kaska, Vihul, International Cyber Incidents. Legal Considerations (NATO CCDCOE, 2010), p 24 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books/legalconsiderations.pdf 
2 Katharina Ziolkowski, Stuxnet – Legal Considerations, (NATO CCDCOE, 2012, Tallinn), p 3, 
https://ccdcoe.org/multimedia/stuxnet-legal-considerations.html  
3 Katharina Ziolkowski, Stuxnet – Legal Considerations, (NATO CCDCOE, 2012, Tallinn), p 4, 
https://ccdcoe.org/multimedia/stuxnet-legal-considerations.html 
4 A denial of any physical damage by Iranian officials was reported by: Reuters, After Stuxnet: Iran 
says it's discovered 2nd cyber attack, in: The Jerusalem Post online available at 
http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=217795  
5 “The first case of a successful cyberattack on energy objects has been registered in Ukraine” Ukrainian 
National News Link: http://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1552689-minenergovugillya-pershiy-u-sviti-
vipadok-vdaloyi-kiberataki-na-obyekti-energetiki-zareyestrovano-v-ukrayini 
6 US DHS ISC-CERT Alert Link: https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01 
7 Plėta, T., Karasov, S., Jakštas, T. 2018. The means to secure critical energy 
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Simultaneously, hackers struck a powerful blow to the computer networks of the 
energy company “Kyivoblenergo”. The hackers managed to access the IT systems 
controlling the substations of the company by temporarily disrupting the electricity 
supply to end consumers.1 
To summarize, the interrupted power supply led to the disconnection of 220 
thousand consumers between 1 to 3.5 hours. It should be noted that a shutdown did 
not cause serious damage to the electricity system of Ukraine. It was a loss 73 MWhrs 
(0.015% of electricity consumption per day).2 
After the cyberattack on Kyivoblenergo, some others followed. For instance, the 
“North” substation of 330 kV (NEC “Ukrenergo”) was completely de-energized on 17 
December 2016. This resulted in the outage of a load of 144.9 MW for the “Kyivenergo” 
Public Company (Kyiv City) and of 58 MW for another company, “Kyivoblenergo” (the 
Kiev region). A Kyiv pump-storage plant was also de-energized with a loss of in-house 
supply.3 
According to some analysts the attack was more sophisticated but was not fully 
exploited (attackers had the power to do worse) and may have been just a “test” of a 
new capability.4 
 
Consequences and effects of cyberattacks on CI and right self-defense in light 
Article 5 of NATO Treaty 
 
In the analysis and literal interpretation of Article 5 of NATO Treaty it becomes 
clear that these norms do not foresee consequences in terms of content. However, take 
in account opinion of ICJ5 that the scale and effects required for an act to be 
characterized as an armed attack, it should be focus on such elements of “Armed 
Attack” as consequences. 
If a cyberattack leads to a significant number of fatalities or causes substantial 
physical damage or destruction to vital infrastructure, military platforms or 
installations or civil property, it could certainly be qualified as an ‘armed attack’ 
within the meaning of Article 5 of NATO Treaty. A digital attack against information 
systems linked to vital infrastructure, military installations and platforms for 
weapons systems or vital services, such as the emergency services or air traffic control 
                                                                                                                                                                  
infrastructure in the context of hybrid warfare: the case of Ukraine, Journal of Security and 
Sustainability Issues 7(3): 570. http://doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2018.7.3(16)  
1 Vytautas Butrimas NATO ENSEC COE. Cyber-attack on UKRAINE’S CEI (2015) Case Study, Energy 
Security Awareness Course, Tbilisi, Georgia, 26  April 2017. 
2 Vytautas Butrimas NATO ENSEC COE. Cyber-attack on UKRAINE’S CEI (2015) Case Study, Energy 
Security Awareness Course, Tbilisi, Georgia, 26  April 2017. 
3 Threat Intelligence Report, Cyberattacks against Ukrainian ICS. The views expressed by V. Butrimas 
are for NATO, NATO member countries, NATO partners, related private and public institutions and 
related individuals. Link: https://www.sentryo.net/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/EBOOK_CYBERATTACKS-AGAINST-UKRAINIAN-ICS.pdf 
4 Threat Intelligence Report, Cyberattacks against Ukrainian ICS. The views expressed by V. Butrimas 
are for NATO, NATO member countries, NATO partners, related private and public institutions and 
related individuals. Link: https://www.sentryo.net/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/EBOOK_CYBERATTACKS-AGAINST-UKRAINIAN-ICS.pdf 
5 Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), 27 June 1986, para. 195, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/70/070-19860627-
JUD-01-00-EN.pdf 
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systems, could breach the threshold of an armed attack if it causes significant loss of 
life or physical destruction.1 
Consequently, neither the attacks on Estonia in 2007 nor Stuxnet on Iran in 2010 
and Ukraine in 2015, 2016 fall within the definition of armed attack. Those attacks 
did not cause any human or material damage and the disruption that they did cause 
was contained and was manageable. 
However, from opinion of Benedetto, the first approach leaves out cyberattacks 
that have serious consequences without actually causing physical damage, 
destruction, injury or death. Consider for example a cyberattack that targets the 
financial system of a State or other CI, such as SCADA networks, severely affecting 
the functioning of a State or even causing a State to be paralyzed. It appears 
disproportionate that these cyberattacks would not reach the threshold of armed 
attack, while their effects may be more severe, long lasting and on a greater scale than 
other effects caused by traditional armed attacks. 2 
Others experts took the view that it is not the nature (injurious or destructive) of 
the consequences that matters,3 but rather the extent of the ensuing effects.4 Roscini 
suggested that in order for a cyberattack to amount to an armed attack, it has to be a 
use of force first, such an operation that causes or is reasonably likely to cause 
extrinsic physical damage to persons or property or severe disruption of critical 
infrastructures, in spite of a contrary opinion.5 Dinstein has suggested some examples 
of cyberattacks serious enough to amount to “Armed Attacks” without extrinsic 
physical damage to persons or property.6 
NATO member countries such as the United States and the Netherlands indicate 
what the criteria could be for a cyberattack without physical consequences to 
constitute an “armed attack.”7 
Cyberattacks can produce multiple effects. The primary effects are those on the 
attacked computer, computer system or network, the deletion, corruption, or alteration 
of data or software, or system disruption through a DDoS (Distributed Denial of 
Service) attack or other cyberattacks. The secondary effects are those on the 
infrastructure operated by the attacked system or network (if any), its partial or total 
                                                 
1 Cyber Warfare, No 77, AIV / No 22, CAVV December 2011, https://aiv-advies.nl/download/da5c7827-
87f5-451a-a7fe-0aacb8d302c3.pdf 
2 Enrico Benedetto Cossidente, “ Legal Aspects of Cyber and Cyber-Related Issues Affecting NATO ”, 
NATO Legal Gazette 61, 35 (2014): 32, 
http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/legal_gazette_35.pdf 
3 Michael N. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 342. 
4 Advisory Council on International Affairs, Cyber Warfare, No. 77, AIV / No 22, CAVV, at 21 
(December 2011) (stating the implied approval by the Netherlands of the position that:  ‘if there are no 
actual or potential fatalities, casualties or physical damage’, a cyber operation targeting ‘essential 
functions of the state could conceivably be qualified as an “armed attack” . . . if it could or did lead to 
serious disruption of the functioning of the state or serious and long-lasting consequences for the 
stability of the state.’), https://aiv-advies.nl/download/da5c7827-87f5-451a-a7fe-0aacb8d302c3.pdf  
5 Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International law (UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 71. 
6  “Cited from: Dinstein, ‘Computer Network Attacks’, p 105“, Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and the 
Use of Force in International law (UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 73. 
7 Florentine J.M. de Boer, “ Examining the Threshold of “Armed Attack” in light of Collective Self-
Defence against Cyber Attacks: NATO’s Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy”, NATO Legal Gazette 61, 35 
(2014): 33, http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/legal_gazette_35.pdf 
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destruction or incapacitation. Tertiary effects are those on the persons affected by the 
destruction or incapacitation of the attacked system or infrastructure, for instance 
those that benefit from the electricity produced by a power plant incapacitated by a 
cyber operation.1 
The 2011 AIV/CAVV Report on Cyber Warfare, the jus ad bellum conclusions of 
which have been endorsed by the Dutch government, states that “a serious, organized 
cyberattack on essential functions of the state could conceivably be qualified as an 
‘armed attack’ within the meaning of articles 5 of NATO Treaty and 51 of the UN 
Charter if it could or did lead to serious disruption of the functioning of the state or 
serious and long-lasting consequences for the stability of the state”.2 
Thus, the author agrees that the consequences and effects of cyberattacks are of a 
diverse nature. The presence of serious damage, destruction or death is not 
mandatory, it is enough to disrupt the functioning of the CI of the state for a 
sufficiently long period, which may entail further serious consequences. Also, the 
author found a difference in views on such approaches of NATO member states. A 
single approach within NATO is necessary, its form can be different. 
 
Conclusions 
 
To conclude the analysis of the meaning cyberattacks as “Armed Attacks” on the 
objects of critical infrastructure in light article 5 of NATO treaty author come forward 
with the following points: 
1. The objects of the cyberattack can be either military and civilian, government 
or private, even situated outside the State’s territory. When it comes to cyberattacks, 
in most cases they are conducted on CII, which is directly connected to the automatic 
control of critical infrastructure. 
2. Cyberattacks as “Armed Attack” can be with consequences as physical damage, 
destruction, injury or death and without of such consequences if it significantly affects 
the performance of State functions in various sectors of security, defense, economy, 
and society. 
3. As a result of a legal analysis of the consequences and effects of an armed 
attack, it can be assumed that the case in Estonia in 2007 reaches the level of an 
armed attack in light Article 5 of NATO Treaty. Although cyberattacks during of 3 
weeks did not cause serious destructive damage to the state, however, created a 
negative economic, informational and social effect during this a long period. This was 
not allowed to perform state functions. 
4. The case Stuxnet in Iran in 2010 shows not clarity in the consequences and the 
effects after a seriously organized cyberattack. Similarly, the cyberattack did not 
create long-term destruction or termination of CI and does not reach the level of an 
armed attack. 
5. Cases in Ukraine in 2015, 2016 should be seen as a cyber company that 
consisted of several cyberattacks on CEI. However, the consequences, unlike Estonia, 
                                                 
1 Marco Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International law (UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 52-53. 
2 Cyber Warfare, No 77, AIV / No 22, CAVV December 2011, https://aiv-advies.nl/download/da5c7827-
87f5-451a-a7fe-0aacb8d302c3.pdf 
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were not prolonged or destructive and thus did not reach the level of an armed attack. 
This led to a criminal investigation at the national level. 
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